This paper analyzes a regulation game with asymmetric information and lack of commitment. It expands Besanko and Spulber's (1989) framework to the case of elastic demands using a generalized Nash solution. It is found that the most important property of the equilibrium with inelastic demand is not carried over to the elastic demand case, i.e., incomplete information worsens underinvestment, contrasting to Besanko and Spulber's result.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that long-term relationships in which parties cannot commit to future actions can result in inefficiencies due to "opportunism." (See Kydland and Prescott (1977, 619-637) and Williamson (1975) .) In the case of a relationship between a firm and a regulator, the lack of the regulator's commitment to set prices that allow the firm to recover the full amount of sunk investment results in lower-than-optimal levels of investment. On the other hand, introduction of asymmetric information in regulatory games has captured significant amount of research. (See the pioneering work of Baron and Myerson (1982, 911-930) .) Furthermore, solutions to dynamic problems also recognize as crucial the ability to commit not to use information revealed throughout the game. (See Laffont and Tirole (1988 , 1153 -1175 and Baron and Besanko (1987, 413-436) .)
In a recent paper, Besanko and Spulber (1989) analyze a regulatory environment, with the regulated firm possessing private information about its cost. 1 The structure of their model is as follows: the firm observes a realization of a cost parameter (0) and then chooses a level of investment (k); the regulator does not observe 0 but observes k, which allows him to infer 0 and set the ~price accordingly, given that he is unable to respect any previous agreement with the firm.Z The demand function and the level of investment are observed by both parties without incurring any cost. Limiting the study to the case of a perfectly inelastic demand 1
A modified version of their paper is Besanko and Spulber (1992). 2
As it is the case in screening models with commitment, in which the timing is basically reversed. See Baron and Myerson (1982) . function, they find that the regulator is able to separate fully the different types of firms. The regulator is seen as offering a price schedule to the firm satisfying the condition that the information revealed by the firm when choosing an investment level does not induce the regulator to change its initial offer. Among other findings, they conclude that asymmetric information alleviates underinvestment and that it can even happen that the less efficient firms overinvest, as those are the firms that need to invest more to signal their low state of technology. This paper extends Besanko and Spulber's model and shows that the effect of asymmetric information upon the level of investment depends on the elasticity of demand faced by the regulated firm. I accordingly let the demand function be elastic (with a constant elasticity greater than one). The equilibrium is also separating. Incomplete information, though, worsens underinvestment for the least efficient firms. This result is due to the fact that for elasticities greater than one investment is a decreasing function of the technology parameter 0, for which the inefficient firms have to invest less than in the complete information case, so that the incentive compatibility constraint of the more efficient firms is satisfied.
The Model
Let the demand function be given by
where x represents quantity, p is the price, and ~ is the demand elasticity. An exogenously given firm is scheduled to provide the whole market. Following Besanko and Spulber, the regulated firm has a cost function x20 (2)
C(x,k,O) = -~ + rk,
where k is the level of investment, r is the rental cost of capital, and 0 is the efficiency parameter of the firm (0 e [00,01]), i.e., the 00 firm is the most efficient one. The term x20/2k corresponds to operating costs, which are decreasing on the level of investment. Both the firm and the regulator know D(p), while r and k are also public knowledge. 
3 This is also the case in Besanko and Spulber's (1989) paper, although, since they consider an inelastic demand function, the consumer surplus (and, indeed, the whole problem) is only defined by introduction of a consumers' maximum willingness to pay for the outcome. 4
To make the result of this paper contrast with that of Besanko and Spulber (1989) solely due to the elasticity of demand, I chose to use the same welfare function with a minor additional variable ~), which Besanko and Spulber consider (implicitly) equal to one.
